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Conflict resolution often involves mediators who understand the issues central to both sides of
an argument. Mediators in complex networks represent nodes that are connected to other key
nodes in opposing subgraphs. Here we introduce a new metric, mediation centrality, for iden-
tifying good mediators in adversarial policy networks, such as the connections between indi-
viduals and their reasons for and against the support of controversial topics (e.g., state-financed
abortion). Using a process-based account of reason mediation we construct bipartite adversar-
ial policy networks and show how mediation defined over subgraph projections constrained to
reasons representing opposing sides can be used to produce a measure of mediation centrality
that is superior to centrality computed on the full network. We then empirically illustrate and
test mediation centrality in a “policy fluency task,” where participants generated reasons for or
against eight controversial policy issues (state-subsidized abortion, bank bailouts, forced CO2
reduction, cannabis legalization, shortened naturalization, surrogate motherhood legalization,
public smoking ban, and euthanasia legalization). We discuss how mediation centrality can be
extended to adversarial policy networks with more than two positions and to other centrality
measures.
Introduction
Adversarial systems can be defined as systems composed
of individuals with opposing views, such as Democrats ver-
sus Republicans in US politics or Leave versus Remainers
in the Brexit discussion. Numerous recent studies have in-
vestigated the development of adversarial information envi-
ronments that can isolate individuals from the views of their
opponents, such as echo chambers and filter bubbles (Bar-
berá et al., 2015; Nikolov et al., 2015; Weng et al., 2012).
This isolation can lead to overconfidence and further polar-
ization and, counter-intuitively, may be especially prominent
in information-rich environments (Hills, 2018). These sys-
tems often form over ideological divisions and extend even
to the truth value of science, with the end result that such
groups rarely see eye-to-eye and are severely insulated from
one another in relation to beliefs and social contacts (e.g.,
Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Shi et al., 2017).
To make progress on controversial issues in adversarial
systems, it can be useful to identify individuals who are best
able to help collective problem solving. Such individuals
should be able to guide others towards recognizing and ac-
knowledging the beliefs and values of individuals on differ-
ent sides of an issue (Mutz, 2002). For example, a capac-
ity for perspective taking—the ability to understand and ac-
knowledge views on different sides of an issue—is one of
the most effective tools of a good negotiator (Galinsky et al.,
2008). Similarly, convergent framing that identifies a col-
lectively recognized description of the problem can help fa-
cilitate conflict resolution (Drake & Donohue, 1996). From
the perspective of conflict resolution (Deutsch et al., 2006),
it is this ability to recognize the collective perspectives (Ku
et al., 2015) that is a defining characteristic of a good media-
tor. Such good mediators maximize the opportunity that the
majority of individuals on each side of the issue can agree on
what the disagreement really comes down to.
Adversarial systems of the kind described above can be
considered complex networks, where individuals are con-
nected to other individuals by acknowledgement of shared
reasons supporting opposing sides of an issue. Although net-
work science has proposed many centrality metrics for iden-
tifying key nodes in a variety of contexts (Bonacich, 2007;
Borgatti, 2005; Freeman, 1977; Newman, 2018; Sabidussi,
1966), we know of no metric for identifying mediators in
adversarial systems, and more specifically adversarial policy
networks, where a network is adversarial because it contains
information representing more than one position about the
policy. Adversarial policy networks can be represented by
bipartite networks, where individuals are connected by edges
to the reasons they acknowledge. Figure 1A provides an em-
pirical example of such a bipartite adversarial policy network
based on reasons—and the individuals who recognize those
reasons—concerning the policy issue of reducing the mini-
mum number of years of residence to become a naturalized
citizen in Switzerland (based on empirical results of a study
described later in the paper). In such adversarial policy net-
works, the reasons can support only one of several sides of an
issue. Such a network can be projected onto persons (where
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Figure 1. An example of a bipartite adversarial policy network around the issue of speeding up naturalization of foreigners in
Switzerland (based on empirical results of a study described later in the paper). (A) The bipartite network composed of persons
and the reasons they acknowledge. (B) Projections of the bipartite network onto persons, where individuals are connected if
they share at least one reason, or onto reasons, where reasons are connected if they are both produced by the same person.
Blue indicates reasons or persons favoring reduced naturalization times and red indicates reasons or persons against reduced
naturalization times. (C) The person projections based on bipartite networks constrained to only contain either pro or con
reasons. Blue indicates persons favoring reduced naturalization times and red indicates persons against reduced naturalization
times; persons’ attitudes towards the policy issue were assessed using a separate survey item.
individuals are connected if they share at least one reason)
or reasons (where two reasons are connected if they are pro-
duced by the same person; Figure 1B). By constraining the
reasons to be on one side of the issue one can further describe
subgraphs of individuals who are connected in relation to ei-
ther pro or con reasons (Figure 1C).
In bipartite adversarial policy networks, there are reasons
for and against the policy as well as individuals who ac-
knowledge different subsets of those reasons, with some in-
dividuals recognizing reasons on both sides of the issue. A
good mediator in this space is someone with high centrality
in all subgraphs. Importantly, by this definition, a good medi-
ator is not necessarily someone who recognizes the most rea-
sons or the reasons that would make the most people happy,
nor is it someone who acknowledges an equal amount of rea-
sons among the various positions—or even a person who rec-
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ognizes those reasons that would best cover the reason space
as defined by what people collectively acknowledge (a met-
ric, representativeness, which we describe below). Each of
these attributes can be gamed simply by adding more people
or poor quality reasons. The method we describe below is
immune to such subterfuge.
The central contribution of this paper is the introduction
and investigation of mediation centrality—a network mea-
sure for identifying mediators in bipartite adversarial policy
networks. Mediation centrality is computed by combining
centrality metrics from subgraph projections where the pro-
jections are defined in relation to different sets of reasons.
In what follows, we first define bipartite adversarial pol-
icy networks and then describe our novel mediation metric
for identifying graph mediators on these networks. We then
evaluate this mediation metric using simulated bipartite ad-
versarial policy networks and show that mediation central-
ity captures the notion of a good mediator who is the best-
recognizer-of-best-recognized-reasons in a hypothetical dis-
cussion that follows an associative path through the argument
space. A good mediator in this space would have the most to
contribute to this discussion. We then empirically illustrate
this mediation metric in a “policy fluency task,” where par-
ticipants generated reasons for or against a range of contro-
versial policy issues.
Mediation centrality
Bipartite adversarial policy networks, mediation, and
centrality metrics
Bipartite adversarial policy networks can be represented
as graphs, G(V, E), where vertices, V , are composed of indi-
viduals, I, and reasons, R, with edges, E, connecting individ-
uals to reasons (Figure 1A). For the network to be adversar-
ial, reasons represent positions with respect to the policy and
are therefore exclusive to one subgraph. As we note below,
this can be extended to any number of positions, but for ease
of exposition we assume that reasons can only be either for
or against the policy.
The projection of reasons onto individuals gives a graph
GI(I, E) where individuals i and j are connected in the result-
ing adjacency matrix if they share at least one reason, k ∈ R,
(Figure 1B, left graph), such that
Ai j =
∑
k
Ri,kR j,k
where Ri,k has a value of 1 if reason k is held by individual
i and 0 otherwise. Similarly, one can form projections onto
reasons (Figure 1B, right graph).
The different sides of the position can be represented by
G+(I,R+; E) and G−(I,R−; E), representing the subgraphs
formed by constraining reasons to those either for or against
the issue, respectively. Forming the projections onto individ-
uals as above, we get GI,+ and GI,−, respectively, which rep-
resent individuals’ connectivity solely driven by either pro or
con reasons, respectively (Figure 1C).
There are a variety of centrality metrics that could be com-
puted on each of the subgraph projections, such as degree
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality.
Mediation centrality can be generalized to each of these met-
rics as we will discuss below. However, because we are con-
sidering mediation in the context of a domain where reasons
are represented in individuals’ minds, we are interested in
how ideas are connected between people. In particular, we
are interested in the process of a hypothetical fruitful discus-
sion, where the discussion tracks the structural information
defined by associations between people and the reasons they
collectively acknowledge. In such a setting, a good media-
tor is someone who would contribute maximally to this hy-
pothetical discussion because she knows and can introduce
the collectively important reasons into the discussion. She
therefore is a best-recognizer-of-best-recognized reasons (as
we show below). We identify this mediator by making two
assumptions: that thought is associative and that people are
connected, among other things, by shared ideas.
In “Trayne of Thoughts,” (Hobbes, 1998) recognized what
has become a truism in contemporary cognitive science: one
thought gives rise to another in relation to the association be-
tween them (Hills et al., 2012; Griffiths et al., 2007). Extend-
ing this idea to a collection of individuals in an adversarial
policy network, we imagine a simple model of a social pro-
cess whereby individuals activate one another by their shared
reasons, with one individual stating one reason and another
responding to that reason with another associated reason that
comes to mind. This process can be formally described as
a random walk through policy space, where transitions be-
tween individuals occur by choosing edges at random in the
collective associative representation.
A projection of the bipartite adversarial policy network
onto individuals captures this process, whereby individuals
are connected if they can activate one another through a
shared idea. A random walk over this subspace is equivalent
to the process described above. The probability of moving
between two nodes in this subspace is described by the tran-
sition matrix T and describes a Markov process which con-
verges to a stationary distribution over successive transitions
(Norris, 1998).
This stationary distribution can be represented by the vec-
tor x. Stationarity implies that further transitions do not affect
the distribution, such that
x = Tx,
where x is the eigenvector associated with the largest eigen-
value of T. T is the normalized adjacency matrix represented
4 HERZOG
as follows,
Tij = Aij/
n∑
k=1
Akj
The values of the stationary distribution x corresponds to
a special case of PageRank (Brin & Page, 1998) for nondi-
rected graphs. PageRank is a network measure, which has
been applied to numerous cognitive and social phenomena
(e.g., Austerweil et al., 2012; Borge-Holthoefer & Arenas,
2010; Ding et al., 2009; Griffiths et al., 2007). Roughly
speaking, the PageRank of a node corresponds to the prob-
ability of finding a random walker at that node, where the
walker is subject to a Markov process constrained by the ad-
jacency matrix. Although mediation centrality can be gener-
alized, in principle, to any centrality metric (such as degree
centrality, betweenness centrality, and closeness centrality),
in the description of mediation centrality that follows we will
restrict our investigation to PageRank because it follows the
logic outlined above of a discussion constrained by the struc-
ture of associative relations between reasons as they occur
among people. However, in the discussion we will argue that
which centrality metric is most appropriate for any domain
will depend on the processes involved in that domain.
Computing mediation centrality over subgraphs
Centrality measures are routinely computed on the full
network and may therefore be considered global centrality
measures. As we show later, a global measure of central-
ity does not capture the basic logic of a good mediator be-
cause mediators need to be able to mediate discussions be-
tween different positions. That is, in the context of adver-
sarial policy networks, an individual with high centrality on
GI(I, E) may not be a good mediator across opposing sub-
graphs. Specifically, they may not acknowledge issues that
would make them central to GI− and GI+ at the same time. To
handle this problem, we define a node’s mediation centrality,
M, as the harmonic mean of its centrality values across sub-
graphs
Mi =
2
1/xi,+ + 1/xi,−
=
2xi,+xi,−
xi,+ + xi,−
where xi,+ and xi,− represent the centrality computed for node
i from the subgraphs GI+ and GI−, respectively. The har-
monic mean captures our intended notion of mediation cen-
trality because it is dominated by the smallest (minimum)
centrality across the subspaces. In particular, the right-most
part of the above equation for Mi highlights that if either xi,+
or xi,− is zero, Mi = 0—irrespective of the value for the other
centrality.
More generally, the harmonic mean H is a Schur-concave
function, which implies that for any positive set of inputs we
have min(x1 . . . xn) ≤ H(x1 . . . xn) ≤ n min(x1 . . . xn). This
means that H cannot be made arbitrarily large without also
changing the value of its smallest input. In particular, if any
input is zero, H = 0, irrespective of the values of all other in-
puts. The geometric mean is also a Schur-concave function.
However, we chose the harmonic mean in analogy to compu-
tations of average speed: When a vehicle travels at rate a and
then at rate b for equal distances, then the average rate is the
harmonic mean of a and b. Loosely speaking, the average
“rate” of a mediator’s contribution within a subspace is how
often they contribute to the random walk in the associated
subgraph (i.e., how often an individual is visited by the ran-
dom walk). If we assume an analogous concept of equidis-
tant paths through the pro and con argument spaces, the aver-
age rate of an individual’s contribution is proportional to the
harmonic mean of their contributions over subgraphs.
For adversarial policy networks consisting of n subspaces
representing n positions, mediation centrality is defined as
M =
n∑n
i=1 xi−1
,
where xi is the centrality for the ith subspace computed from
GI,i. This conveniently reduces to the standard centrality
measure for the case of only one subspace (n = 1).
Note that mediation centrality is different from the
subgraph centrality described by Estrada & Rodriguez-
Velazquez (2005), which merely “counts the times that a
node takes part in the different connected subgraphs of the
network,” such as triangles, four cycles, and so on.
Mediation centrality vs. representativeness
Earlier we argued for a process-based measure of media-
tion that can capture structural relations between social and
cognitive processes. We then identified PageRank as a suit-
able network metric for such a mediation measure. Here
we introduce and formalize the cognitive notion of represen-
tativeness, a cognitive measure designed to capture reason
coverage in a population. We note that representativeness—
unlike mediation centrality—does not incorporate network
structure. Comparing mediation centrality to representative-
ness helps to highlight the potential weaknesses of simple
counting measures.
To develop the notion of representativeness, let us assume
a unit called a person–reason, which represents a reason held
by one person. Two person–reasons can reflect two differ-
ent people who each acknowledge one reason—which may
or may not be the same reason—or one individual who ac-
knowledges two different reasons. By this unit, ten people
who all acknowledge the same, one reason (= 10 person–
reasons) have a less formidable reason space than ten people
who acknowledge five reasons each (whether or not they are
shared; = 50 person–reasons). If we assume that a reason
in an individual’s mind represents a slot in the adversarial
space, then the total adversarial space for one side of an issue
is the sum of the slots, that is, the sum of all person–reasons.
This assumes that reason slots are interchangeable. This may
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Figure 2. The reason space consists of reasons and the num-
ber of individuals that hold those reasons. We present a ran-
dom individual who acknowledges reasons #1, #3, #4, #5,
#8, and #18, which are held by 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, and 1 persons,
respectively. The person-reasons covered by this person are
shown in orange and represent this individual’s representa-
tiveness, ρ = 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 12.
not always be the case as some reasons may be more convinc-
ing than others even though they are held by fewer individu-
als. Incorporating a reason’s normative weights is beyond the
scope of the current paper (but see Russell & Reimer, 2018,
for some ideas to build on).
For illustration, Figure 2 depicts an adversarial space con-
sisting of 20 unique reasons and 28 person–reasons—with
one reason held by 4 individuals, two reasons held by three
individuals each, and so on. The extent to which an individ-
ual covers this space is a measure of their representativeness
ρ. We can therefore define the representativeness of an indi-
vidual as the sum of the slots (person–reasons) they cover in
the adversarial space
ρ =
n∑
i∈C
wi,
where for each reason i in that individual’s set of reasons,
C, we sum the number of individuals wi who acknowledge
that reason. An individual with a higher ρ is an individual
who better covers the adversarial space over which C is rep-
resented. Accordingly, we can compute ρp and ρc to indicate
the representativeness within the pro and con reason spaces,
respectively.
As computed here, a node’s representativeness within a
subgraph is equivalent to the node’s weighted degree in a
network, where edge weights reflect the number of shared
reasons, plus the nodes unweighted degree, representing the
number of reasons held by the individual. The addition of the
node’s unweighted degree could be removed to avoid situa-
tions where an individual creates unique, idiosyncratic rea-
sons to amplify their own representativeness. In the present
case, we leave this in with the assumption that the individ-
uals in the network reflect the population from which they
are sampled. This also fits the framing in the empirical study
below where we asked individuals to generate reasons they
believe would be held by others.
We define mediation representativeness over multiple
spaces, ρˆ, by the harmonic mean of the representativeness
over subgraphs,
ρˆ =
n∑n
i=1 ρ
−1
i
where n is the number of subspaces. As in the definition of
median centrality (see earlier), the harmonic mean best cap-
tures our intended meaning of mediation representativeness
because it is dominated by the smallest representativeness
across the subspaces. This prevents individuals from becom-
ing more representative by merely capturing a larger share of
an already well-represented subspace.
Though M and ρˆ may often be correlated in practice—
and indeed are well correlated in the empirical study we de-
scribe below—they need not be correlated. To see why, con-
sider a reason network where two candidate mediators have
identical Ms and ρˆs. The first candidate can improve her ρˆ
by listing one more reason on each side of the policy issue.
However, her M remains unchanged, as it crucially depends
on the reasons being recognized by others. In other words,
M does not change because it is sensitive to the structure of
the person–reason network space.
Evaluation: Simulation studies
Simulation 1
Consider a policy debate with two positions, for and
against, with corresponding pro and con reasons. Individuals
are aware of various reasons on both sides of the debate. The
goal is to identify mediators in this space who are the best
recognizers of best-recognized reasons on both sides of the
debate.
To simulate this, let there be N = 100 individuals in a pol-
icy debate on an issue (e.g., legalization of cannabis) where
there is a universe of 10 possible distinct pro reasons and 10
possible distinct con reasons. Each individual samples a to-
tal of 10 reasons: 10β pro reasons and 10 (1 − β) con reasons
(rounded to the nearest integer). β then represents an indi-
vidual’s bias; a β = 0.5 represents an unbiased individual. In
this simulation, an individual’s β is uniformly sampled from
[0, 1].
We allow reasons to have a power law distributed proba-
bility p of being sampled, where p ∼ r−γ with γ = 2.5 and
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rank r. The precise value of γ is unimportant to the overall
results except that for larger values of γ all individuals will
produce the same reason and for small values of γ all reasons
will be sampled uniformly. In such cases everyone is the best
mediator (since everyone produces the same reasons) or the
best mediator is the individual with the most number of rea-
sons per position, since all reasons are equally represented.
Thus, intermediate γ’s are the most interesting formulation
and also the formulation that best reflects the empirical data
presented later.
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Figure 3. Individuals’ centrality values and bias in Simu-
lation 1. The centrality value of an individual is computed
using two methods (mediation centrality and global central-
ity) and shown on the y-axis as a function of the individual’s
bias. Bias is shown here as the integer number of reasons on
the pro side (i.e., 10β).
Using what individuals sample, we produce a bipartite ad-
jacency matrix where individuals are rows and reasons are
columns. As described above, we then project this matrix
onto individuals for the pro and con reason subspaces sepa-
rately and then compute individuals’ mediation centrality as
the harmonic mean of their centrality measures across both
subspaces.
Figure 3 shows the relationship between global centrality
(i.e., computed from the projection onto individuals based on
the full bipartite network) and mediation centrality. Global
centrality shows a limited ability to discriminate among in-
dividuals’ different degrees of bias for or against the policy
issue. Mediation centrality, on the other hand, captures the
central intuition of mediation, whereby individuals with the
least bias, β = .5, have the highest mediation centrality. No-
tably, however, the individual with the smallest bias is not
necessarily the one with the highest mediation centrality. The
variation in mediation for a given level of bias is a measure of
the individual’s ability to capture the most well-recognized
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Figure 4. Comparison of mediation representativeness
against mediation centrality and global centrality in Simu-
lation 1. Each individual is represented by a dot. (A) Rep-
resentativeness for pro and con reasons. Dot size represents
mediation centrality value. (B) Representativeness for pro
and con reasons. Dot size represents global centrality. (C)
The global representativeness against mediation centrality.
(D) The global representativeness against global centrality.
reasons within a subgraph. Consider that individual’s with
no bias (β = 0.5) will produce an equal number of reasons
from both sides of the issue, but these reasons may not be
equally representative of the sides from which they are sam-
pled. Therefore, more biased individuals can (up to a point)
still be better recognizers of best-recognized reasons.
Figure 4 relates each simulated agent’s representativeness
ρ for pro and con spaces against each other and against the
same agent’s mediation centrality, M, and global centrality.
The figure reveals a number of insights. Foremost, as to be
expected, individuals who have higher representativeness in
the con subspace have lower representativeness in the pro
subspace. This is because the number of reasons produced
is fixed and split across the subspaces. Secondly, individ-
uals who are highly representative of one or the other of
the two subspaces have lower mediation centrality (smaller
sized dots; Figure 4A). Global centrality, on the other hand,
is influenced by greater representativeness of either pro or
con sides (Figure 4B). A comparison of mediation centrality
with representativeness across both the pro and con spaces,
ρˆ, shows that mediation centrality captures the intuition that
mediators must acknowledge key ideas on each side of the
issue (Figure 4C); global centrality lacks this property (Fig-
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Figure 5. Individuals’ centrality and bias values in Simu-
lation 2. The centrality value of an individual is computed
using two methods (mediation centrality and global central-
ity) and shown on the y-axis as a function of the individual’s
bias.
ure 4D). In addition, also note that the individual with the
highest M is not the individual with the highest ρˆ.
Following the notion of a random walk through policy
space, we can also verify that mediation centrality tracks the
residence time of random walkers on each subgraph. Figure
A1 in the Appendix shows the outcome of releasing 1,000
random walkers from each individual and tracking the res-
idence times for each node in the network. Mediation cen-
trality is again highest for the individuals who are least biased
in their residence times (Figure A1-A). Global centrality, in
contrast, is less discriminating (Figure A1-B). Comparing
mediation centrality against the harmonic mean of residence
times shows a close relationship between the two measures
(Figure A1-C). Global centrality, in contrast, does not show a
clear relationship with the harmonic mean of residence times
(Figure A1-D).
Simulation 2
To further examine the characteristics of a good media-
tor, we ran a second simulation where there are 100 reasons
in total, 80 against and 20 in favor of the policy issue; all
other simulation details are identical to Simulation 1. Fig-
ures 5, 6, and A2 (in the Appendix) show the corresponding
results. As expected, mediation centrality is relatively un-
affected by the imbalance between the number of con and
pro reasons and identifies individuals who are both unbiased
and more representative; global centrality, in contrast, can-
not capture the differences between the two subgraphs (Fig-
ure 5). Note also that the individual with the highest global
centrality has the lowest mediation representativeness and is
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Figure 6. Comparison of mediation representativeness
against mediation centrality and global centrality in Simu-
lation 2. Otherwise this figure follows Figure 4.
strongly biased towards producing pro reasons (Figure 6D).
Finally, mediation centrality again tracks the harmonic mean
of random walker residence times, whereas global centrality
fails to capture this (Figure A2 in the Appendix).
The two simulations presented have highlighted the use-
fulness of mediation centrality in identifying good mediators
across two sides of a policy issue. In the next section, we
apply this measure to empirical data on actual policy issues.
Mediators in Adversarial Policy Networks: An
Empirical Study
To test mediation centrality in a real-world context, we
collected data for eight policy issues (Table 1). Participants
in this study were asked to imagine that they would be mod-
erating a discussion on a specific policy proposition and that
in preparation for this meeting they should list all the pos-
sible reasons in favor or against the proposition they could
think of that might come up in such a discussion. We call
this task the “policy fluency task” following similar tasks in
the category fluency literature, such as the animal and coun-
try fluency tasks, where individuals name all the animals or
countries they can think of, respectively (e.g., Hills et al.,
2012; Hills & Segev, 2014).
Methods
Participants. Fifty-three participants (median age =
22; 40 females) were recruited at the University of Basel
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Policy issue Policy question: Should... Con Pro % Pro
State-subsidized abortion ... the state subsidize abortions? 33 18 35
Bank bailouts ... the state bail out banks during an economic crisis? 20 26 57
Forced CO2 reduction ... developing countries be forced to reduce CO2 emissions? 29 20 41
Cannabis legalization ... the possession and consumption of cannabis be legalized? 29 20 41
Shortened naturalization ... the minimum years of residency for citizenship be reduced? 14 25 64
Surrogate legalization ... surrogate motherhood be legalized? 25 23 48
Public smoking ban ... public smoking be banned? 23 28 55
Euthanasia legalization ... medically assisted suicide by legalized? 22 31 58
Table 1
The 8 Policy issues. Con and Pro: Number of participants in favor of or against the policy; % Pro: percentage of participants
in favor of the policy. The issues were framed in the context of the country in which the study was conducted (Switzerland).
(Switzerland). As this experiment was a non-clinical study
and did not involve any patients, according to Swiss federal
law it did not require an in-depth evaluation and approval by
a cantonal review board.
Materials and Procedure. We conducted a pilot survey
to identify policy issues for which in our participant popula-
tion there is non-negligible support for both sides of an issue.
Table 1 shows the eight issues used in the main study.
The primary data for this study are the reasons partici-
pants generated for each policy issue. Next to this primary
data, we collected several additional variables that were not
investigated in relation to mediation centrality. In the spirit
of full disclosure we nevertheless report them below when
describing the experiment. All instructions were in German;
we present their English translations here. The experiment
was programmed in E-Prime 2.
1. To measure working memory capacity, participants
completed an operation span task (Unsworth et al.,
2005).
2. Participants were asked to imagine that they would be
mediating a discussion on a specific policy proposition
(e.g., legalizing cannabis) and that their role was that
of an impartial mediator. In preparation for this dis-
cussion they would list all the arguments (i.e., reasons)
for and against the current proposition they could think
of that other people might find important for deciding
in favor or against the policy proposition. For each
of the eight policy issues (Table 1), participants were
instructed to write down each reason they could think
of using 3-4 words and submit it by pressing ENTER.
Once they could not think of any more reasons, they
proceeded to the next issue by pressing a button on the
screen. Policy issues were presented in a new random
order for each participant.
3. For each of the eight policy issues participants indi-
cated their own position (i.e. in favor or against the
policy proposition).
4. Participants indicated a set of demographic variables
(age; gender; Swiss citizen status; smoking status;
cannabis consumption).
5. Several self-rating questions assessed participants’ po-
litical stance. The first question asked participants
to place themselves on the political left- vs. right-
wing spectrum by choosing a point on an analogue
scale. Then for each of eight Swiss political par-
ties participants indicated to which degree they agreed
or disagreed with their political agenda. Partici-
pants choose a point on an analogue bipolar scale
that ranged from “total disagreement” to “total agree-
ment”. The eight political parties were: Schweizer
Volkspartei (SVP); Sozialdemokratishe Partei (SP);
Freisinning demokratische Partei/FDP - Die Lib-
eralen; Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP);
Grüne Partei (GPS); Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei
(BDP); Grünliberale Partei (GLP); Evangelische
Volkspartei (EVP)
6. We assessed participants’ self-reported ability for per-
spective taking based on the four items of the German
version (Paulus, 2009) of the Interpersonal Reactivity
Index (Davis, 1983). Participants indicated the degree
to which four statements applied to them by choosing
a point on an analogue bipolar scale that ranged from
“does not apply at all” to “fully applies”. In their orig-
inal English formulation (Davis, 1983) the statements
read: “I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagree-
ment before I make a decision.” “I believe that there
are two sides to every question and try to look at them
both.” “Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine
how I would feel if I were in their place.” “When I’m
upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put myself in his
shoes’ for a while.”
Three raters independently judged for each reason
whether it was in support of (+1) or against (−1) the policy
issue or whether they could not tell (0); we then summed the
values and took the valence of the sum to indicate whether
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Figure 7. Bipartite adversarial policy networks for each issue, with reasons shown as boxes (red = con, blue = pro) and
individuals shown as circles (green).
the reason was pro or con. Out of the total 1, 778 reasons
produced, 324 had zero valence. We excluded these as they
often do not refer to coherent reasons.
For each issue, a fourth rater created overarching cate-
gories of reasons to which the produced reasons were then
assigned; 7 of the remaining 1,454 reasons failed to be coded
and were removed. The assigned categories were then used
to compute the values in the adjacency matrices. For exam-
ple, one individual wrote “murder of the fetus” and another
wrote “it is murder” which were then classified under the
same category “abortion is murder.” An individual’s repre-
sentativeness was calculated by considering the number of
unique reason categories for which a participant produced
at least one reason. This was done to avoid inflated values
of representativeness when a participant produced multiple
reasons that all belonged to the same reason category.
After the two rating procedures, 1,447 reasons remained,
which were used in all further analyses reported. The sum of
the counts in Table 1 indicate how many out of the 53 par-
ticipants produced at least one valid reason for the respective
issue.
Results
Table 1 shows the number of individuals on each side of
each issue. Our pilot survey aimed to identify policy issues
for which there would be substantial support for either side in
our participant population. Consistent with this goal, each of
the issues showed non-negligible support for both positions.
These levels of polarization suggest that the issues used in
the study represent a good test bed for investigating media-
tion centrality.
Figure 7 shows the bipartite adversarial reason networks
for each issue. The networks each have one giant component,
which shows that people on both sides of each issue tend to
acknowledge reasons on both sides of the issue. Thus, even
though these are controversial issues, participants were—at
least partly—aware of the reasons the other side holds. This
implies that identifying mediators as individuals who are
the best-recognizers-of-best-recognized-reasons is a plausi-
ble endeavor in this study.
Mediation centrality is useful to the extent that it varies
across individuals in adversarial policy networks. Figure 8
shows that mediation centrality produces a clear ranking of
individuals within each of the eight very different policy is-
sues. This is promising for two reasons. First, it implies that
even among controversial topics there is a range of adver-
sarial understanding among people. Second, more pragmat-
ically, the result also implies that there are individuals who
would be much better mediators than others.
Although the mere number of reasons produced by an
participant is a rough proxy for the participant’s mediation
centrality, it is a poor direct substitute for mediation cen-
trality. Figure 9 shows that although the highest mediation
centrality corresponds in some cases to the individual with
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Figure 8. Participants’ mediation centrality, ranked from largest to smallest, for each of the eight policy issues.
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Figure 9. Mediation centrality M of an individual (y-axes) plotted as a function of the number of reasons produced by that
individual, separately for each policy issue.
the most reasons produced, this not always the case. Bailing
out banks, shortened naturalization, forced CO2 reduction,
public smoking ban, and surrogate legalization demonstrate
cases where producing the most reasons does not make one
the best mediator.
Figures 10 compares mediation centrality M and medi-
ation representativeness, ρˆ. The results are consistent with
those shown in the simulations, indicating that individuals
with higher ρˆ also have higher M. However, they also show
how in this real-world context ρˆ can differ for individuals
with the same M, such as the outliers in abortion and citi-
zenship, which represent dyads separate from the respective
giant components (networks not shown). Figure 11 shows
similar results when comparing mediation centrality with the
residence times of 1,000 random walkers starting at each in-
dividual in each subgraph. M is strongly correlated with
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Figure 10. Mediation centrality M of an individual (y-axes) plotted as a function of mediation representativeness ρˆ of that
individual, separately for each policy issue.
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Figure 11. Mediation centrality M of an individual (y-axes) plotted as a function of the harmonic mean of random walk
residence times (across both pro and con subgraphs), separately for each policy issue.
the residence times of random walkers in the reason space.
These results for mediation representativeness and random
walk residence times demonstrate that mediation central-
ity conforms to our intuition of what a good mediator for
these policy issues might look like: Someone who is a best-
recognizer-of-best-recognized reasons.
General Discussion
The present article has two goals. The first and primary
goal is to introduce a new measure for network scientists that
captures an interesting and useful property of bipartite adver-
sarial policy networks. As we show, mediation centrality has
useful quantitative properties that can identify nodes in bipar-
tite networks that may be particularly suited for certain tasks
12 HERZOG
in adversarial settings. The second goal is to produce a mea-
sure of mediation that may be useful to social and cognitive
scientists. Though this article focuses primarily on the for-
mer of these two goals, we nonetheless empirically demon-
strated how mediation centrality is a meaningful measure for
adversarial policy networks which should be useful in future
studies that aim to provide more detailed quantification of the
often rather qualitative conceptualization of mediation (see
Deutsch et al., 2006).
In relation to complex networks, the mediation central-
ity measure we present, focusing on PageRank, is a partic-
ular instance of a more general family of possible measures
of mediation centrality. Other centrality measures, such as
closeness centrality or betweenness centrality, could be used
in lieu of PageRank in the measure of mediation centrality
we presented. However, we argue that for the task of medi-
ation in adversarial policy networks, a measure of mediation
that closely corresponds to social and cognitive processes is
preferable to process-agnostic, descriptive measures, such as
representativeness or other, more generic measures of net-
work centrality. Nevertheless, such alternative measures are
likely to be meaningful in other settings where they may
closely correspond to other processes of interest. For ex-
ample, when a bee colony tries to locate a position for their
beehive that appropriately minimizes travel to resources of
different types, closeness mediation centrality may be highly
appropriate. Mediation centrality can also be adapted to
weighted subgraphs in relation to their relative importance
by some other criteria, such as, for example, the number of
people holding a particular position on the issue, or the value
of different reasons (e.g., pollen over nectar in the beehive ex-
ample above; Seeley, 2009). Indeed, mediation centrality is
a highly flexible approach for constructing quantitative mea-
sures and there is ample room for variations. For example,
mediation centrality as proposed here is designed to measure
mediation within a network dedicated to a given adversarial
issue. But it may be valuable in the future to be able to quan-
tify the degree of mediation across multiple policy issues,
with correspondingly different associative structures.
In addition, future investigations of mediation from a
more social psychological perspective should focus on sev-
eral factors that were not addressed here. Foremost, we did
not capture the strength with which individuals held the po-
sitions they reported themselves as having. For example, we
did not capture the strength with which an individual sup-
ported laws against public smoking, only that they did or did
not. It would be useful to have a more graded measure of
position, as one then could investigate whether individuals
with high mediation centrality are also individuals who hold
more moderate positions on these issues. This, of course,
may not be the case. Good mediators by our measure may
also—by virtue of their knowledge of what other individuals
believe—be better persuaders. In this respect, future studies
of mediation would also benefit by investigating the extent to
which individuals with high mediation centrality can produce
arguments that are more likely to lead to solutions recognized
by both sides.
Future studies should also investigate the extent to which
individuals believe the reasons they acknowledge to reflect
legitimate arguments. Although we use a rather coarse mea-
sure of acknowledgement, merely involving the production
of a reason, it may be that these reasons are acknowledged to
different degrees. Both of the above issues could be adapted
into future measures of mediation. Finally, it is important to
note that mediation centrality, as we propose it here, is social-
network agnostic. It solely focuses on what you know and not
on who you know. Nonetheless, in many contexts, mediators
may be most effective when they simultaneously know the
relevant parties involved and recognize the best-recognized
reasons held on alternate sides of the issue.
Conclusion
Individuals who can take the perspectives held by oppos-
ing sides of an issue and frame arguments in a way that both
sides can agree on often help to generate better solutions dur-
ing conflict resolution (Drake & Donohue, 1996; Galinsky et
al., 2008; Kemp & Smith, 1994). We apply this concept to
mediators by extending perspective taking to a process-based
account of mediation. This allows us to introduce mediation
centrality, a metric for quantifying the mediation value of
individuals in adversarial policy networks. Mediation cen-
trality formalizes the notion of a good mediatior in a collec-
tive cognitive representation of an adversarial policy space
aggregated across multiple individuals and positions. Using
simulations and empirical data from eight real-world policy
issues, we show that mediation centrality follows the intu-
ition of what it means to be a good mediator, and we further
show how this outperforms other measures and captures the
logic of a random walk over reason space.
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Figure A1. Comparison of mediation centrality against random walk residence times in Simulation 1. Otherwise this figure
follows Figure 4.
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Figure A2. Comparison of mediation centrality against random walk residence times in Simulation 2. Otherwise this figure
follows Figure 6.
